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Abstract- Electronic Passport (e-passport) is one of the results of the electronic revolution in the 
World; since the passport is the document of the person in terms of identity and nationality and is the 
property of the country. One of the most important challenges is to protect this document from 
forgery. The common forgery for the passport is replacing its holder photo. The proposed system 
concentrates on the security part of the e-passport. It consists of two parts; the first part is hiding of 
the security code by using steganography and storing the same code in the RFID tag by the issuing 
country of the e-passport. The other part will be operated at the control point of the destination 
country to make sure of the e-passport validity by checking the hidden code using NFC and verify it 
with the one in the RFID tag. If the two values are equal, then the system will compute a key using 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. This key will be used to read the secret information in the tag.
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Abstract-
  
Electronic Passport (e-passport) is one of the results 
of the electronic revolution in the World; since the passport is 
the document of the person in terms of identity and nationality 
and is the property of the country.
 
One of the most important 
challenges is to protect this document from forgery. The 
common forgery for the passport is replacing its holder photo.
 
The proposed system concentrates on the security part of the 
e-passport. It consists of two parts; the first part is hiding of 
the security code by using steganography and storing the 
same code in the RFID tag by the issuing country of the e-
passport. The other part will be operated at the control point of 
the destination country to make sure of the e-passport validity 
by checking the hidden code using NFC and verify it with the 
one in the RFID tag. If the two values are equal, then the 
system will compute a key using Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. 
This key will be used to read the secret information in the tag.
 
Keywords:
 
steganography, nearest field communication, 
radio frequency identification, and epassport.
 
I.
 
Introduction
 
peed, time and security components have 
become the most important success factors in any 
developed system and at the same time number 
of travellers around the world is increasing continuously. 
Since the airports are the main ports of the States, the 
movement of passengers through the gates in order to 
verify the identity of travellers requiring high accuracy to 
make sure that no forgery and no impersonate the 
passport holder.
 
E-passport technology (Kundra & et al, 2014) 
has become an important substitution of the traditional 
passports in the access controls intended for travel 
around the world since the authentication of the 
passenger using it becomes faster, more secure, and 
more preserving of the privacy of passengers (Juels& et 
al, 2005). In addition, the forgery processes of the 
traditional passports are not available in the e-
Passports.
 
Some of these challenges are cloning, and 
spoofing of RFID. Other challenges are the 
impersonation and eavesdropping attacks on
 
the reader 
devices. The communication between the Tag and 
inspection system are controlled by the cryptography 
techniques to overcome these types of attacks. 
 
 
 
 
II. Literature Reviews 
An Anti-Cloning and Anti-Skimming Protocol 
(ACASP) (Saeed & et al, 2009) has been proposed to 
counter the vulnerabilities of Basic Access Control and 
Active Authentication with respect to RFID chip 
skimming, and cloning. It takes advantage of public-
private key pair stored in the chip and the optional data 
storage capacity in Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) of 
the passport. An advantage of ACASP is that it can be 
implemented without any modifications in the hardware 
of the reader and the Tag. And there is no need to make 
changes in the Logical Data Structure (LDS) of the RFID 
chip.
 
(Benssalah et al., 2012) proposed an 
authentication algorithm based on elliptic curves 
ElGamal encryption (ElGamal, 1985). The main benefits 
of this protocol are that fights against four types of 
security threats; Simple power analysis and timing 
analysis, Passive attacks, Man-in-the middle, and 
Replay attack. 
Al-Hamami (Al-Hamami & Al-Anni, 2005A) 
suggested some new authentication method by using a 
firm authentication method by extracting some features 
for the original name of the holder with the passport 
number and digest them in a form, by applying some 
techniques, that can be hidden in the passport's photo.  
A method for e-passport verification depending 
on watermarking (Wang & et al, 2013) has been 
proposed which is composed of multimodal biometric 
feature and the parity check code of that multimodal 
biometric feature. The need for the multimodal biometric 
feature is to verify the passport owner, and the parity 
check code is for the verification of the integrity of the 
passport itself. 
The main idea in (Peeters et al., 2014) is to use 
mutual authentication protocol pattern instead of 
bootstrap from the low entropy value in MRZ. In order to 
protect the e-passport holder’s privacy, terminal 
authentication takes place first, and then the e-passport 
authentication which uses Sigma-I or IBIHOP+. 
(Al-Hamami & Al-Anni, 2005B) suggested a 
protocol to solve the problem of e-passport verification 
and authentication. (Al-Hamami & Al-Anni, 2005) 
suggested to use an invisible watermark to be hidden in 
the passport headshot to solve the problem of the 
passport verification, and they also suggested to use 
Diffie–Hellman to solve the problem of mutual 
S
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authentication between the e-passport and the 
inspection system. 
III. Statement of Problem 
The aim of this paper is to propose a method to 
enhance the security part of the epassport. Since the 
epassport is an international issue, we tried to use an 
international security method. This will be done by using 
an international prime number code assigned for each 
country, using a secret code for every country for 
privacy, and using unified methods Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange to create the exchanged key and 
steganography method to hide the secret code for 
privacy and authentication (Hariri & et al, 2011). 
IV. The Proposed Solution 
This paper aims to use a global method for 
greater security of epassport at airports check points. 
This depends on giving each country its own prime 
(what’s wrong in this key? The main idea of Diffie-
Hellman and ElGamal is to use a large prime number) 
number. This number should be a prime number or it will 
be converted to a prime number so that it can be used 
in the proposed framework of scrutiny and increased 
passport security.
 
In general, the proposed method is to use 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange Algorithm to share a 
private key between the Tag and the Inspection System 
(IS). The inspection system will use NFC technology in 
the reader devices which allows the reader to 
communicate with RFID Tag without needing to touch 
the devices together or go through multiple steps setting 
up a connection and allows the exchange of information 
between devices through short-range waves about four 
centimeters a maximum so as to prevent contact by 
mistake to other devices.
 
A calculated value will be hidden in the passport 
photo by using steganography method. When, the 
passport holder arrives the access control, and during 
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange process, the reader 
obtains a value from the Tag. Then, the reader scans the 
passport photo and compares the value hidden in the 
photo with the obtained value; if they were identical, the 
reader can make sure that the Tag is not cloned and it is 
authenticated.
 
After the mutual authentication process 
between the Tag and the reader, and after each of them 
calculates the secret key using Diffie-Hellman, the Tag 
sends the identification data (which are stored in 
plaintext format) of the passport holder using 
asymmetric encryption algorithm (ElGamal encryption 
system) to convert the plaintext into cipher-text and then 
the reader reconverts the cipher-text into plaintext. 
Figure 1 explains the proposed framework.
 
 
 
Figure 1 :
 
A Phase one (e- passport generation)
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E
 Figure 1 :  B phase two (e-passport    (verification and 
mutual authentication) 
The proposed method consists of two phases; 
e-passport generation phase, represented in Figure 1.A, 
and e-passport verification and mutual authentication, 
represented in Figure 1.B. 
a) Phase one is composed of three algorithms. Each 
one is responsible for one type of processes. These 
algorithms have to be performed by the originator 
country. 
V. Algorithm One (Parameter 
Acquisition) 
a) Read the applicant identification data. 
b) Validate entries. 
c) Store the entries in the e-passport chip. 
VI. Algorithm Three (Text 
Steganography) 
a) Using Diffie-Hellman algorithm, generate the 
public key (A). 
b) Generate a random number (r) and store it in 
the     Tag. 
  d)
 
Hide the generated public key (A) in the 
headshot using Least Significant Bit encoding 
(LSB) steganography technique. Use the 
random number (r) as a password for the 
steganography process.
 e)
 
Phase two is composed of four algorithms. 
These algorithms have to be performed by the 
access control country.
 
VII.
 
Algorithm One (Mutual 
Authentication)
 
Continue the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which 
has been started in step (a) of algorithm three of phase 
one, in order for the chip and the reader to obtain a 
shared secrete key (K).
 
VIII. Algorithm Two (E-Passport Chip 
Verification) 
a) Using ElGamal algorithm, obtain the random 
number (r). 
b) Extract the hidden value from the headshot, and use 
the value (r) as the password for that. 
Obtain the public key value (A) from the chip 
during Diffie-Hellman algorithm. 
Compare the extracted value in step (b) with 
obtained value in step (c); if they were identical, so the 
chip is the original one and not cloned. Otherwise, the 
chip is cloned and the e-passport holder must not pass 
the access control, and there is no need to perform the 
algorithms two, three, and four. 
Identification and Biometric Data Conversion to 
Cipher (Using ElGamal Encryption) 
Use ElGamal decryption algorithm to convert 
the identification and Biometric, which were stored in the 
chip, into cipher text. Send the cipher text to the reader 
device. 
   
 
a) Receive the cipher text from the e-passport 
chip. 
b) Use ElGamal encryption algorithm to convert 
back the cipher text to its original plaintext 
value. 
Example for non-forged passport 
Suppose that the value of the automatically 
generated prime number (p) is 23, the value of the 
modular number (g) is 5, the value of (p) and (g) are 
common between the RFID and the reader. Suppose 
also the secret number of the RFID (a) equals 6, and the 
secret number of the reader device (b) equals 15. Now 
these values have to be followed across the overall 
process. 
Enhancing Security to Protect E-Passport against Photo Forgery
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X. Decryption of the Cipher text 
(using Elgamal Decryption)
Scan the headshot of the applicant.c)
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At the passport side, it calculates the public key 
(A). (A = ga mod p), (A) = 8. On the other hand, the 
reader device calculates its public key (B). (B = gb mod 
p), (B) = 19. 
After generating the public key (A), it will be 
hidden in the headshot of the passport bearer. When the 
passenger arrives to the access control of the 
destination country communication between the E-
Passport and the inspection system carries on. The 
RFID sends the value A to the reader, and the reader 
sends the value B to the RFID.  Based on Diffie-Hellman 
algorithm, when the E-Passport calculates its secrete 
key  KRFID = Ba mod p (KRFID = 196 mod 23=2).and the 
reader calculates its secrete key KRaeder = Ab mod p 
(KRaeder = 815 mod 23=2), and after checking the 
equality state of them, if they were identical, a message 
saying that Mutual authentication passed will appeared. 
Now the system will Extract the hidden value (A) from 
the headshot, and compare it with obtained value from 
the RFID chip; if they were identical, so the chip is the 
original one and not cloned. 
After the passport authentication and 
verification, it has to encrypt the identification data using 
ElGamal encryption algorithm in order to send them to 
the reader device. The final step happens in the access 
control country in which the reader needs to decrypt the 
encrypted identification data sent to it from the E-
Passport. 
X. Conclusion 
The use of e-Passport is technology 
increasingly used in different countries overall the world. 
It aims to fight against the forgery activities of the 
traditional passports. This paper proposed to develop a 
security technique to be used with the e-passport in the 
airports to read its holder information by using Radio 
Frequency technique (RFID). 
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The proposed security method proved that it 
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The authentication of the validity of the epassportis 
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The proposed security method kept the privacy of each 
country in dealing with its secret code.
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